New legislative directions at the end of the cold war: Germany, Czech Republic, and Russia

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Nuevos rumbos legislativos al final de la Guerra Fría: Alemania, República Checa y Rusia

Novas direções legislativas no final da guerra fria: Alemanha, República Tcheca e Rússia

Nouvelles orientations législatives à la fin de la guerre froide : L'Allemagne, la République tchèque et la Russie

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Abstract. This theoretical study aims to describe and analyze the parliamentary system established at the end of the Cold War in Germany, the Czech Republic, and Russia, after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The change of the political system was considered the starting point, which gave way to a market economy and a modern democracy. The parliamentary discipline is also analyzed as an input for governance within a new political regime of the legislative power. Concepts such as cohesion, discipline, and unity are addressed to understand the functioning of this power according to the political regime of the moment. The tendency of Congress towards a democratic scheme is evident by observing the operational dynamics of the parliamentary system. The methodology used was theoretical, descriptive, and deductive.

Keywords: Cold War; Czech Republic; Germany; legislative system; Russia.

Resumen. El presente estudio teórico tiene como objetivo describir y analizar el sistema parlamentario que se estableció al fin de la Guerra Fría en Alemania, República Checa y Rusia, después de la caída del Muro de Berlín. Se considera como punto de arranque el cambio del sistema político, que dio paso a una economía de mercado y a una democracia moderna. También, se analiza la disciplina parlamentaria como un insumo para la gobernabilidad dentro de un nuevo régimen político del poder legislativo. Se abordan conceptos como cohesión, disciplina y unidad para entender la actuación de dicho poder en función del régimen político del momento. Mediante la visualización de la dinámica operativa del sistema parlamentario, se evidencia la tendencia del congreso hacia un esquema democrático. La metodología utilizada es teórica, descriptiva y deductiva.

Palabras clave: Alemania; Guerra Fría; República Checa; Rusia; sistema legislativo.

Résumé. Cette étude théorique vise à décrire et analyser le système parlementaire mis en place à la fin de la guerre froide en l’Allemagne, la République tchèque et la Russie, après la chute du mur de Berlin. Le point de départ est le changement du système politique, qui a laissé place à une économie de marché et à une démocratie moderne. En outre, la discipline parlementaire est analysée comme un apport à la gouvernance dans un nouveau régime politique du pouvoir législatif. Des concepts tels que la cohésion, la discipline et l’unité sont adressés pour comprendre la performance de ce pouvoir, selon le régime politique du moment. En visualisant la dynamique opérationnelle du système parlementaire, la tendance du congrès vers un schéma démocratique est évidente. La méthodologie utilisée est théorique, descriptive et déductive.

Mots-clés : Guerre froide ; L’Allemagne ; La République tchèque ; La Russie ; système législatif.
Introduction

One of the most significant global changes, resulting from the disappearance of the so-called Cold War was the new direction of the legislative systems of countries constituted by an entirely State-controlled political system (or what some analysts insist on calling “communist systems”). The structural change from a statist political system to a more open one produced particular modifications in one of the State’s systems of power, the legislative system, which went from being a somewhat rigid Congress —without repercussions, influence or autonomy in decision-making— to one more critical of shared powers.

It is the parliamentary systems, which offer the best representation of an entire population; thus, the concentration on one of the powers allows a rearrangement of the citizen representation in the structure of the government system. Two of the three countries analyzed here are a fundamental part of the European Parliament. They face, among other situations, the lack of a truly uniform procedure for European parliamentary elections, illustrating not only the difficulty of reconciling different national traditions but also, the learning processes involved in understanding each one’s internal politics in their participation in the European Parliament.

The objective of this theoretical study was to obtain a view of Russia, Germany, and the Czech Republic’s political situation, before the disappearance of the Cold War, as well as to understand and analyze the functionality of the parliamentary system after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. A fundamental variable on which this study focuses is the parliamentary discipline as a functional element of the parliamentary systems of the State, which is seen by various authors —among them, Valencia (2005)— as an input for parliamentary governance.

Therefore, in the following theoretical proposal, the first approximation is to the characteristics of the legislative system of the three countries mentioned, which became States with a system of democratic openness and greater political participation, as well as countries with significant elements of democracy.

This study provides the academic and citizen community a first approximation to understanding the process of change (within a parliamentary environment) of a closed system of State into a democratic system of economic openness. With this, a general overview of the systemic transfer is provided to offer researchers the opportunity to generate prospective analyzes regarding these countries’ tendency in the field of parliamentary democracy. In fact, contemplating the changes in the political system of the countries provides all actors in the political arena, as well as students, the guidelines of these phenomena to develop in parliamentary governance and make predictions on the behavior of the different forms of government.
I. The political order of communist systems: parliamentary discipline?

The public recognition that the political systems of the world were moving in different directions drew attention to the systems that were assumed as communist regimes. From a democratic perspective, it was questioned whether these systems were being effective, according to the characteristics that the international political system was acquiring. This concern became tangible with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

In the years after the First World War, the ruling party of the German Empire was no longer in dialogue with the parliament and, seemingly, it had ended its dialogue with the liberal parties, and was decided to seize power through violence. One could already glimpse the domination exercised by the State over the parliamentary system. Similarly, from 1948 to 1989, a communist government led the current Czech Republic; that is, the State control exercised was present as a system ascribed under the USSR, with which it maintained a legislative system similar to the Russian (Valvidares, 2003)

Nonetheless, the force that maintained the domination and control of the communist system was the USSR, which operated within a single-party framework in Congress, thus, allowing state governance. However, several world-countries, with dominant-party Congresses, were undergoing significant changes in the political systems, among them, countries like the Czech Republic and the Soviet Union, which were a conglomerate of countries with controlled or statist systems.

It must be noted that of the initiators of the major structural reforms of the USSR’s political system was Gorbachev, and one of the first reforms was the economic reform in 1989, which they called a socialist market economy. This plan was concluded in 1995 (Aganbeguián, 1991).

Gorbachev’s arrival into power was decisive for the USSR’s change of course. He was chosen because he belonged to the so-called “soft line,” that is, to those who pursued economic reforms and political changes, starting with reforms within the system’s existing limits, and then continuing with its reorganization (Perestroika). Gorbachev argued that the country needed major transformations, and the parliamentary system was no exception; it needed to be reactivated and integrated with a multi-party system.

It was after 1990 that Boris Yeltsin, the first president of Russia, began the struggle to separate government from the central power. Yeltsin and his moderate nationalist supporters believed that the time had come; hence, they created the conditions for full Russian independence, as well as the replacement of the previous Soviet governmental centralist structures, which prevailed in the old regime (Alvarado, 1992).
The dissolution of the USSR occurred in 1991, giving way to the Commonwealth of Independent States, which, starting in 1993 (Alvarado, 1992), created a form of government of the Russian reformist elite, which fragmented and embarked on a process of ideological involution that, in some cases, damaged Russia’s democratic projects.

While the second great reformer of the USSR, Boris Yeltsin, acquired greater popularity than Gorbachev, the latter was responsible for taking the first steps to dismantle the communist system and the greater freedom of expression observed during these periods, including the legislative branch’s right to openly criticize the executive branch (establishing one of the paths towards democracy).

In fact, the State's control over the legislative system, under the communist regime, cannot be attributed to the functional efficiency of cooperation between the dominant powers but the order exercised by a party’s absolute control associated with the part in power. Therefore, the way in which legislative work was exercised, in controlled systems, was due to what Weber called the domain of power. In this regard, this author pointed out that “dominating, necessarily, means the ability to command and exercise coercion so that the objective is fulfilled, the subjected can escape any power except the governing power” (Weber, 2010, p.18); in other words, it is a command-obedience characterization. From another perspective of analysis, this functionality of parliamentary order is called legislative discipline.

Legislative discipline is defined as the action and effect that governs the legislative body of each political party in a parliamentary system (author's definition supported by the Diccionario de la Lengua Española). This phenomenon has a variety of explanations, among them, factors exogenous of Congress, the predominance of a single party, and the meta-constitutional power of the president, factors that, as a whole, led to determine legislators’ specific structured behaviors. This occurred in systems in which the absence of democratic elements created the conditions for deputies to establish themselves in a legislative discipline. For Valencia (2005) legislative discipline is

[…] perceived as a synonym of submission and condemned by those guided by the traditional definition of the representative mandate, under the notion that parliament should not receive more instructions than those of their own conscience. Once there is a plurality, the connotation of the discipline changes because it is a mechanism, which allows the simplification of the coherence of the parliamentary groups. (p.6)

However, confusion can arise regarding the terms of parliamentary cohesion and discipline. According to Valencia (2005), the first is defined as the result of what maintains legislators linked, as a common goal or common interest. Parliamentary discipline, on the other hand, refers to the product of the control exercised by party leaders over legislators
or members of the latter. For greater clarity, the similarity of concepts and the substantive
difference between them from the legislative perspective is analyzed in Table 1.

Table 1. Definitions and concepts related to cohesion and discipline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Unit of Analysis</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion</td>
<td>Partisan behavior</td>
<td>Degree of party members' homogeneity in the legislative field (Ruiz and García, 2001; Sartori, 1994).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline</td>
<td>Individual behavior</td>
<td>Party member compliance (Bowle, Ferrel and Katz, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Partisan behavior</td>
<td>Degree of interrelation between cohesion and discipline (Morgenstern, in press).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty</td>
<td>Individual behavior</td>
<td>Frequency of party members’ change of party label (Ruiz and García, 2001).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coherence</td>
<td>Shared ideas of the party members</td>
<td>Degree of congruence in the ideological and program-related positions of the members of a party (Ruiz and García, 2001).</td>
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These definitions involve a degree of proximity between the political actors, in this case, the legislators, who are differentiated by the objective they seek to achieve. In the case of systems with a state regime, all the definitions mentioned above were effective forms of control and the leader in power marked legislative productivity.

The mentioned terms are favorable for some government actions because they benefit the executive’s proposals, provide the expeditious outlet to laws, and generate a cooperative relationship between the executive and the legislature branches. However, this does not mean that it is the most democratic occurrence in a parliamentary system; on the contrary, they signify a lack of consensus and indicate that the executive’s political interest is being placed before the citizen’s interest.

These terms bring us to consider that, if the executive branch is the dominant leader in a government with a majority party, consequently, domination in Congress, there will be, among other things, reduced scrutiny of the executive power, which clouds the processes of evaluation between powers. According to these arguments, the parliamentary discipline in the communist systems represented control and domination by those who exercised power. In fact, the compliance of the deputies was subject to a linear structure that provided the ruler a broader margin of unmonitored maneuverability, which could
be considered a mere simulation of a parliamentary system. Consequently, given the influencing circumstances of the international system towards the tendency of a system of economic openness and open politics, the communist forms of government were declining because of the end of the war between the two powers.

II. Legislative order after the fall of the Berlin Wall

As mentioned previously, the end of the Cold War brought with it endless changes in the economic, political, social systems, and, of course, in the legislative systems. In the new order, taking place in Western Europe and in Eastern Europe, the restructuring of the legislative system rethought the way of doing politics in systems that were formerly of the State. These topics will be discussed in the following sections.

The German legislative system

In comparison with other European countries, the German parliamentary system was introduced later, as the figure of the Federal President weakened it. Post-war Germany established federalism as its form of State organization; that is, a form of parliamentary democracy government. The parliamentary system was constituted as follows:

- **Bundestag** (Chamber of Deputies) composed of at least 656 members, of which 328 were directly elected, and 328 (in principle) by proportional representation, using the Niemeyer method; in other words by free, universal, and secret elections, for a term of four years. The Bundestag was responsible for electing the federal chancellor, subject to the parliament’s confidence.
- **Bundesrat** (Chamber of Senators) composed of 68 directly elected senators, holding a four-year term (González, 2000).

Despite this, and not unlike most parliamentary systems in the process of democratic opening in the world, the lack of cohesion was forthcoming in Germany and brought to an extreme by its fragmented system and non-cohesive parties. However, the process of maturity that was achieved in Germany in the legislative system has allowed this nation to act outside the government in three fundamental aspects: legislation, auditing, and budgeting.

The evolution of the parliamentary system in Germany drove to the construction of a multi-party system, in which five parties now operate. The previous leads us to conclude that the legislative system after the fall of the Berlin Wall was a power constituted of ideologies and forms of democratic representation, framed in the political arena of nego-
tiation, with highly democratic structures and in defense of the citizenship. The legislative procedure is described below:

The legislative procedure gives absolute primacy to the Bundestag, the Bundesrat and government being complementary and supportive instances of it, the Bundesrat brings administrative experience, and the government provides specific knowledge of the matters. The federal president, who has the sanction of the laws, closes the cycle. But, it is clear that legislative competence is a monopoly of the Bundestag. (Monedero, n.d., p.39)

The German Parliament has allowed the representation of minority parties, which have moved in coalition since 1949. In this way, to avoid the fragmentation of the Parliament, the parties must obtain at least 5% of the votes cast to achieve representation in the Bundestag. This condition is explained in Facts about Germany (Bischoff, Chauvistré, Kleis, & Wille, 2015) as follows:

Since the elections to the German 18th Bundestag (2013), the country is governed by a coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, popularly known as the Great Coalition, because it brings together the two main forces of the German party system. Of the 630 seats in the Bundestag, 503 correspond to the deputies of the governing coalition (CDU/CSU 310, SPD 193). The parliamentary opposition, formed by The Left (64 deputies) the coalition 90/The Greens (63 deputies), adds only 127 seats, the lowest figure for more than 40 years. (p.26)

**The Czech Republic’s legislative system**

In the Czech Republic, there was an opening system within the framework of what was called the “Velvet Revolution.” In 1989, the regime was overthrown and former Czechoslovakia, because of its peaceful nature, became a democratic country; this led to the first free elections in 1990. However, following the Constitution of 1992, in January 1993, Czechoslovakia split into two independent states: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. (Casanova, 1997)

In the Czech Republic, the integration of legislative power was structured in a bicameral Parliament, composed of the Chamber of Deputies (called National Council and composed of 200 members) and the Chamber of Senators (composed of 81 representatives of electoral constituencies) whose members are elected by a two-round relative majority, for four and six years, respectively. Among other activities, the Parliament is responsible for the election of the president, the creation and approval of laws, and the manifestation or denial of confidence in the Government. The Czech Republic managed to fulfill one of the most important objectives: to create a political system of parties that functioned in a pluralist parliamentary democracy (Gómez, 2012).
The Czech Republic’s legislative system is responsible for approving international agreements or some amendments to the Constitution, through a vote of over half of both chambers. Because this system also discusses and approves laws, the Czech state is a representation of a democratic parliament, according to the division and tasks of each power (executive, legislative, judicial).

It is appropriate to mention that the progress in professionalization experienced in this country has been fundamental for the consolidation of legislative work. At the beginning of the 90s, the Budget Committee and the Parliament, as a whole, was composed of persons with no experience in high-level politics, and only rarely did they have a deputy with commercial experience. It was collectively decided that the appointments for the Committee would take into account the professional background to ensure that the deputies were more professional and had a more critical view of the work (Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson, & Trapp, 2009).

This professionalization was evidence of a process of transformation and democratic consolidation, given the inexperience of Budget Committee legislators at the beginning of the 90s. Initially, the proposal to take into account professional background made during the first Committee meeting was rejected. However, gradually the deputies have become more professional and learned to obtain information and evaluate critically; currently, it is the most prestigious Committee of the Parliament (Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson, & Trapp, 2009).

The participation of the Czech Republic in the Parliament of the European Union has managed to win 24 seats. After an arduous effort of systematic modifications carried out by the country, the Czech Republic became part of the European Union in May 2004. Like Germany, the Czech Republic has acquired a degree of maturity that has allowed it to act outside the Government in three aspects: legislation, oversight, and budgeting. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Czech Republic and Poland have achieved high levels of democratization compared to other countries with former communist systems. Like post-Cold War Germany, the Czech Republic has constituted its legislative system as a democratic system, tinged with significant development towards the effectiveness of legislative work.

**The Russian legislative system**

The Russian parliamentary system consists of two chambers, the Duma, which is the Lower House of Parliament and the Federation Council, which is the Upper House. Since 1993, the Duma has been composed of 450 members elected every four years by the electoral process. According to De Andrés and Ruiz (2008), the Council of the Federation
and the State Duma form committees and commissions and hold parliamentary hearings on the issues that concern them. The members of the Council and the Duma enjoy immunity throughout the term of their mandate.

The Duma’s influence within the political system is pivotal because it can approve legislation, initiate commissions for investigations, and generate legislative resolutions and extrabudgetary funds. It should be noted that, although it may have power in the creation of laws, the executive branch neutralizes this power.

In 1993, Boris Yeltsin issued Decree 1400, which dissolved parliaments. The Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People’s Deputies appropriated legislative power, ordered elections, and called for a referendum on the new Constitution —whose draft was obscure to the country’s citizens and political class— which violated Article 121.6 of the Russian Constitution and was, therefore, legally unauthorized. According to Yeltsin, “elections were justified because the Russian Federation was a new country, replacing the former Soviet Federal Republic of Russia.” (Sáenz, 2003, p.3)

Following the coup-like action, Parliament met urgently to dismiss President Yeltsin for the violation of the constitutional norm. After a series of disturbances, the president called for parliamentary elections. By that time, Parliament was essentially divided into ultraliberals and ultranationalists. The first communed with Yeltsin’s ideals, the ultranationalists, however, were extreme right, Stalinists that defended the former USSR. Intermediately, there was also a centrist group, which was a critical of what was happening, slightly more nationalist, and opposed to the president.

After 1993, Boris Yeltsin modified the Constitution, making the system of government semi-presidential. As stated by De Andrés and Ruiz (2008), this change gave government the ability to exercise on its own; in their words, “it is a hegemonic presidency free of controls because of the the dominance of the government’s structure and control, which displaces the Parliament of an effective role in both tasks, to govern in an exclusive way.” Like this, the president preserved the accruement of both of the legislative powers, and the power to veto, the ability to legislate by decree, as well as the unrestricted prerogative to cease government and dissolve the State Duma (De Andrés & Ruiz, 2008, p. 4).

As has been discussed, since the collapse of the system in 1989, post-authoritarian legislatures in communist regions developed as different political systems. The Soviet Union entered a presidential regime. As Stapenhurst et al. (2009, p.192) tell us “the development of active and autonomous parliaments varies according to the circumstances, as well as the capacity the parliaments to control the conduct of the government.”

The changes generated by the new economic system allowed large fiduciary auctions (loans for shares) and sales of state companies, incidentally, at very low
costs. Because of these structural changes in the period from 1995 to 2000, the Audit Chamber carried out close to 3,000 investigations, given the high prevailing bureaucracy. According to Remington (2013), the reports had no effect, despite being announced in the press. This setting placed the Chamber at odds with both the Government and the Minister of Finance, specifically, regarding the right to carry out the audits. “The Chamber has no power to make legal charges and its reports only have advisory strength but its power to expose abuses and corruption affects the capacity of parliament.” (Remington, 2013, p. 187)

Prior to the entry of President Putin, the encumbering of the creation of coalitions characterized one of the periods of parliamentary controversy. A fragmented and suspended system was also generated. “The number of parties in Russia’s legislature has substantially varied within and between both parliaments. The combination of a legislative system producing a high number of veto issues and weak mechanisms in the party system to organize majority coalitions has made the Russian legislative process vulnerable to the influences of extra-parliamentary interests” (De Andrés & Ruiz, 2008 p. 26). The previous establishes that the pressure, emerged in the 90s, on the legislative branch had political effects typical of presidential systems.

That said, during the 90s, a recurring problem in the Duma was the influence of lobbyists who protected individuals in areas such as energy, metal extraction, alcoholic beverage production, and the tobacco industry, sectors that supported productivity growth. It is well known that Putin’s success in the legislative branch was greater than Yeltsin’s:

The president went on to control two-thirds of parliament, those that would allow him any legislative change, and, in parallel, to emphasize the loss of weightiness of intraregional or regional forces. It can be concluded that during Putin’s first term, there was a great dissonance between the institutional reforms, which introduced some real improvements in the party system and the practice of electoral manipulation policy, which ensured favorable results to the Kremlin. (Andrés & Ruiz, 2008)

Together, the executive and the Parliament unleashed a series of unforeseen consequences. They sought the reform of the system and ended up transiting into capitalism, they wanted to modernize the political structure, expanding citizen participation, and ended up polarizing society and liberating centrifugal forces carrying other purposes that destroyed the party and state organization. They wanted to rebuild ties with national minorities and ended up with a dissolved USSR. They tried a new way of linking with the world to reduce tension and rationalize external links and ended up losing control of the situations and attributes that elevated the USSR to the rank of a superpower. (Guerrero, J.C., n.d., p.10)

All of the above generated a series of changes and new ways of lobbying to structure the composition of Parliament. In this regard, on September 18, 2016, the last
elections of the State Duma took place —47.9% of the electoral census participated (the participation in 2011 was 60.1%) and were subject to electoral observation by the OSCE-ODHIR— which, according to the Diplomatic Information Office, yielded the following results (2007, p.6):

- **United Russia**: 343 deputies, 76.2 % of the seats (results of 2011 elections: 238 deputies).
- **Communist Party of the Russian Federation**: 42 deputies, 9.3 % (results of 2011 elections: 92 deputies).
- **Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)**: 39 deputies, 8.7 % (results of 2011 elections: 56 deputies).
- **United Russia**: 23 deputies, 5.1% (results of 2011 elections: 64 deputies).
- **Rodina Party (“Nation”)**: 1 deputy (obtained none in 2011).
- **Civic Platform**: 1 deputy (did not stand for election in 2011).
- **Deputies not affiliated with any party**: 1 (Vladislav Reznik).
- **Unfilled**: 1.

The other parties did not exceed the minimum threshold of 5% to enter the Chamber, nor did they win in any of the uninominal districts. It is noteworthy that these elections were conducted peacefully, in an orderly environment, without demonstrations or protests.

### III. Similarities in the legislative systems after the fall of the Berlin Wall

In the shift from a communist system to a democratized system, one of the great challenges to the parliaments was to create temporary committees to achieve the immediate tasks demanded by the open economy. These committees, according to Stapenhurst et al. (2009), were created to address new issues, among them, preparing everything related to access to the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In post-communist democracies, as mentioned in the World Bank study:

A high turnover of parliamentary members has predominated from one election to the next in the first periods. However, most of the members of the new parliaments are new in each period, bringing with them a wide variety of experience and attitudes. (Stapenhurst et al., 2009, p.196)

Let us remember that once the political system began to undergo transformations towards a more democratic process (Figure 1), discipline ceases to be a constant of the system; therefore, it becomes an essential element of analysis. According to Valencia (2005,
p.5), this offers the “possibility of a scenario of paralysis and ungovernability that would impede the functioning of the legislative assembly in a context of a government divided into a majority situation.”

Especially for Germany and the Czech Republic, one factor that had a decisive influence on the development of its legislative system is its membership of the European Union. Even in differentiated times, this membership has allowed them to reach standards that drive its legislators to a process of higher development and structure than in other countries. For instance, the member countries of the European Union’s “code of ethics,” under which the legislator’s ability to carry out dishonest practices that affect the interrelation with citizens is limited.

The above has allowed legislative work to be carried out in a framework of transparency and accountability, which has marked a difference in comparison with countries without a code of conduct or sanctions commissions to punish their legislators, and improved the legislators’ credibility in the eyes of the citizens.

**Final thoughts**

If not a change in the character, the adoption of a democratic parliamentary regime, at least, drove to a correction—even modification—of some of the features of the previous regimes. The three countries described here underwent systems of State control, in which the powers represented by the government were unified with the parliamentary system, and the legislative power represented the interests of the government in power at that time.
As the Berlin Wall collapsed, the communist system championed by the USSR began its decline, impacting the countries that shared a statist system. Thus, the shift from a planned system to a market economy, even if gradual, exposed the countries to a series of uncertain but necessary changes for its evolution. According to Remington (2013, p.194), “the weakened state that experiences democratization during a time of economic crisis is particularly vulnerable to the capture and corruption by powerful interests seeking particular benefits concentrated at the expense of the public.” In the absence of strong institutions, opening the system to competitive elections leads to issues of fragmented authority and, necessarily, to a parliamentary apparatus with low legislative production. This course leads to a momentary instability in the political system to enable the way to a democratic system.

Therefore, currently, the parliamentary system works by legislation and not by decree. For instance, the legislation during President Putin’s term significantly increased budget control and reduced the level of evasions, concessions, and guarantees of irresponsible power in fiscal policy.

To the extent that the parliamentary systems of countries such as Russia, Germany, and the Czech Republic evolved towards democratic systems, the congresses were constituted by a heterogeneous number of parties with different ideologies, which presents the question of how such congresses achieve cooperation. The parliamentary discipline during the communist system contributed to the compliance of the members of a party with the influence of its leader. For Valencia (2005), this limits and motivates the strategic behavior of the deputies, whose control determines the political games of power.

With the change generated by ceasing to be a system of government entirely controlled by the State and having more market and democratic freedom, the parliamentary systems of these countries initiated a new dynamic of lobbying, in which the parties seek to position themselves to have the control of the Congress. Despite this dynamic, for the German Parliament to enter into transitional justice, among other compromises, it has generated a process of apprenticeship as a mediator that has not yet been exploited; this because of the distance created between the Government and the citizenship, instigated by the old ideas of the predominance of the executive over the legislative branch. However, the parliamentarism of the Federal Republic of Germany is an excellent example of a change of tendency of the nation towards a more democratic State.

Regarding the Russian Federation, a factor in favor is that the centralization of political control, which has eliminated access points for corporations and pressure groups around negative aspects, such as the exacerbated growth of lobbying that has taken place in the other countries after the Cold War (De Andrés and Ruiz, 2008).

Concerning the Czech Republic, Parliament has been idealized and polarized in such a way that it has become an obstacle to parliamentary actions. As described in the
document *Monitor Electoral*, even fragmentation of the traditionally right-wing parties was generated, and a new agenda was given for the insertion of direct democracy and a change to the *status quo* (Mexico, Senate of the Republic, 2017).

Based on the creation of a party system, the changes that the political systems of Russia, Germany, and the Czech Republic have undergone have allowed them to generate a system that is more independent of the executive power, with the slight exception of Russia, where the executive still has a hold on the Russian Duma. As observed throughout the description of the parliamentary system of the three countries, the insertion of a political system of democratic and economic openness has allowed the rearrangement of the structure of these parliaments and the entrance into a new dynamic of interaction lacking in the regime before the Cold War, which was entirely controlled by the State.

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