An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information

González Treviño, Javier y Kalashnikov, Vitaly (2012) An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information. In: Intelligent decision technologies. Springer, Heidelberg, pp. 109-118. ISBN 9783642299766

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Resumen

This paper seeks to analyze the implications of relaxing the assumption of rationality by using incomplete information. Specifically, we want to analyze the implications on the uniqueness and existence of equilibrium when individuals form expectations with different distributions of all possible states. This is done by postulating an alternative view of uncertainty in decision making in economic interactions. Thus an alternative model of bilateral bargainingwith incomplete information is formulated.

Tipo de elemento: Sección de libro.
Divisiones: Economía
Usuario depositante: Lic. Jesús E. Alvarado
Creadores:
CreadorEmailORCID
González Treviño, JavierNO ESPECIFICADONO ESPECIFICADO
Kalashnikov, VitalyNO ESPECIFICADONO ESPECIFICADO
Fecha del depósito: 06 Oct 2015 22:28
Última modificación: 06 Oct 2015 22:28
URI: http://eprints.uanl.mx/id/eprint/7693

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