Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly

Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. y Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo y Kalashnikov, Vitaly (2007) Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly. In: Innovative Computing, Information and Control, 2007. ICICIC '07. Second International Conference. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Piscataway, N.J.. ISBN 9780769528823

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Resumen

We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot equilibrium: weak or strong. We compare the profits and domestic social surplus and compare the volume of commodities for various combinations of weak and strong leaders and followers

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