Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly

Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. y Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo y Kalashnikov, Vitaly (2007) Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly. In: Innovative Computing, Information and Control, 2007. ICICIC '07. Second International Conference. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Piscataway, N.J.. ISBN 9780769528823

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Resumen

We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot equilibrium: weak or strong. We compare the profits and domestic social surplus and compare the volume of commodities for various combinations of weak and strong leaders and followers

Tipo de elemento: Sección de libro.
Palabras claves no controlados: Stackelberg equilibrium, Mixed duopoly model
Divisiones: Economía
Usuario depositante: Lic. Jesús E. Alvarado
Creadores:
CreadorEmailORCID
Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V.NO ESPECIFICADONO ESPECIFICADO
Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardoalvaro.corderofr@uanl.edu.mxNO ESPECIFICADO
Kalashnikov, VitalyNO ESPECIFICADONO ESPECIFICADO
Fecha del depósito: 09 Oct 2015 18:57
Última modificación: 09 Oct 2015 18:57
URI: http://eprints.uanl.mx/id/eprint/7774

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