Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly

Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. y Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo y Kalashnikov, Vitaly (2007) Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly. In: International Conference on Innovative Computing, Information and Control, 2007, Kumamoto, Japón.

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Resumen

We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot equilibrium: weak or strong. We compare the profits and domestic social surplus and compare the volume of commodities for various combinations of weak and strong leaders and followers.

Tipo de elemento:

Conferencia o artículo de un taller. (Documento)

Palabras claves no controlados:

Stackelberg equilibrium, mixed duopoly model

Divisiones:

Economía

Usuario depositante:

Editor Repositorio

Creadores:

Creador	Email	ORCID
Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V.	NO ESPECIFICADO	NO ESPECIFICADO
Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo	alvaro.corderofr@uanl.edu.mx	NO ESPECIFICADO
Kalashnikov, Vitaly	NO ESPECIFICADO	NO ESPECIFICADO